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BARRIERS TO FINANCIAL REFORM 
Robert C. Vogel* 
There seems to be widespread agreement, at least among 
most academic economists and technical advisers, that pro-
grams of financial re.form would be beneficial for rural 
financial markets in developing countries and, furthermore, 
that the key element in any program of financial reform is 
interest rates which are at least positive in real terms. 
The purpose of the present paper is not to reiterate the 
many well known arguments against subsidized low interest 
rates and in favor of interest rates which are closely 
tied to the levels that would be determined in competitive 
markets, but rather to ask why so little progress has been 
made in achieving reform in rural financial markets. There 
are, to be sure, a few developing countries which have ini-
tiated, and even maintained, programs of financial reform. 
However, many of the examples of higher interest rates 
which are often cited as signs of progress toward financial 
reform are in fact inadequate even to keep pace with the 
higher rates of inflation that have afflicted most <level-
oping countries in the 1970's. 
*Professor of Economics, Syracuse University, and 
Visiting Professor of Agricultural Economics, Ohio 
State University 
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The lack of progress in reforming rural financial ~· 
markets may simply be due to lack of information; that is, 
the arguments in favor of financial reform have not yet 
been made with sufficient clarity and force to convince 
the key policy makers in developing countries of the need 
for change. However, in the present paper it is assumed 
that lack of progress is not due simply to lack of infor-
mation, and there are a number of reasons which can be 
given to support this view. Not only is there a growing 
literature which convincingly argues the merits of finan-
cial reform, much of it in a form which can readily be 
understood by policy makers, but there is also the direct 
contact between policy makers in developing countries and 
technical advisers who appear to be increasingly willing 
to offer reconnnendations which involve substantial doses 
of financial reform. The fact that international lending 
institutions continue to support projects which fail to 
contain even small doses of financial reform does not mean 
that the employees and technical advisers of these insti-
tutions do not appreciate the advantages of financial reform, 
but rather indicates the depth of the opposition in <level-
oping countries to reforming rural financial markets, 
The present paper examines the source of this oppo-
sition to financial reform and, in particular, four types 
of arguments which have been raised not against financial 
reform per se but against the possibility of actually 
• 
. (.., 
' 
' 
- 3 -
carrying out a successful program of financial reform in a 
typical developing country. These arguments do not neces-
sarily deny the potential benefits of financial reform in 
the abstract, nor do they exhaust the arguments against 
financial reform, and some observers may even think that 
the most common or the most forceful arguments against 
financial reform have not been considered. Nonetheless, 
these arguments do illustrate the substantial barriers 
that must be 0vercome in order to carry out a reform of 
rural financial markets even after the advantages of finan-
cial reform in theory have been recognized. Some of these 
arguments will subsequently be judged to be irrelevant or 
mistaken, but they are nonetheless real barriers to finan-
cial reform and especially so until they have been ade-
quately examined. Moreover, those arguments against finan-
cial reform which are judged to be essentially correct 
must be confronted directly by the proponents of reform 
and weighed against the benefits of reform if the barriers 
to the reform of rural financial markets are ever to be 
overcome. 
Viability of Financial Institutions 
The first argument against putting into practice a 
program of financial reform in spite of the potential 
benefits is that it will lead to the bankruptcy of many 
financial institutions and thereby seriously disrupt the 
economy" As previously indicated, the key element in a 
program of financial reform is raising interest rates to 
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levels that approximate those which would be determined 
in competitive markets, and this may entail substantial 
increases in interest rates, especially in countries 
which have been experiencing high rates of inflation. 
The primary role of most financial institutions is to 
issue liabilities which are short term (e.g., demand and 
savings deposits) and to hold assets which are relatively 
long term.!/ After interest rates have been raised or 
permitted to rise to competitive levels in a program of 
financial reform, financial institutions with this typ-
ical structure of assets and liabilities are likely to 
find themselves facing serious difficulties. On one hand, 
they must almost immediately pay higher competitive rates 
of interest on their short-term liabilities in order to 
retain deposits and avoid a liquidity crisis. On the 
other hand, they cannot expect to charge higher interest 
rates on their long-term loans until these investments 
mature, so that they face potentially large losses, and 
even bankruptcy, depending on the extent of the increase 
in interest rates and the exact structure of their assets 
and liabilities. 
Mathieson has proposed a solution to this problem of 
implementing a program of financial reform while at the 
same time avoiding bankruptcy for a significant portion 
!/ See Gurley and Shaw on the process of financial inter-
mediation. 
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of financial institutions. In his model government policy 
makers have three objectives: to reduce the rate of infla-
tion, to expand the real size of the financial sector in 
order to improve the allocation of resources and increase 
the rate of economic growth (which is the essence of a 
program of financial reform), and to maintain some minimum 
amount of profit for the financial institutions that would 
otherwise be threatened with bankruptcy by a substantial 
increase in interest rates. These policy makers also have 
three instruments to achieve their objectives: a ceiling 
interest rate 6n loans, a ceiling interest rate on deposits, 
and the rate of monetary expansion. Mathieson then uses 
optimal control theory to solve this problem and finds the 
optimal paths for monetary expansion, the loan ceiling 
rate, and the deposit ceiling rate. As is typical in the 
solution of such optimal control problems, there are two 
distinct phases in the optimal behavior of the policy 
instruments. In the first phase, there are relatively 
large discrete changes in the three instruments, as the 
rate of monetary expansion is reduced below its long-run 
steady state value while both the loan and deposit ceiling 
rates are raised above their long-run steady state levels. 
In the second phase, all three policy instruments gradually 
approach their long-run steady state values, but only after 
reversing direction because of their overshooting in the 
first phase. 
It is not the purpose of the present paper to question 
Mathieson's formulation or solution of his model, but rather 
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to ask what relevance this exercise has for policy makers 
in developing countries who may be considering the imple-
mentation of programs of financial reform. The solution 
suggested by optimal control theory is likely to have very 
little intuitive appeal for these policy makers. Recommen-
dations which involve complex paths of overshooting and 
readjustment for policy instruments are unlikely to appear 
convincing to policy makers in developing countries, 
particularly since basing policies on optimal control solu-
tions has made little headway with policy makers even in 
the advanced countries. In fact, such recommendations 
may well convince policy makers in developing countries 
that it is impossibly complex to implement a successful 
program of financial reform and thereby tip the balance 
against reform. Is the technical adviser who advocates 
financial reform thus left with an impossible task, or are 
there other approaches which can achieve financial reform 
without bankrupting a significant portion of financial 
institutions? 
Mathieson (pp. 11 - 12) himself mentions two other 
possible solutions to this problem, but he dismisses each 
of these. First, a program of government loans could 
rescue financial institutions threatened with bankruptcy, 
but this might cause the monetary authority to lose con-
trol over the money supply. Second, a tax-subsidy scheme 
could transfer resources from other sectors of the economy 
' 
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to the threatened financial institutions, but th.is is 
rejected as having higher administrative costs than the 
optimal control policy of interest rate adjustment. How-
ever, before such alternative approaches are completely 
dismissed it would be worthwhile to know under exactly 
what circumstances the monetary authority would lose con-
trol over the money supply or what the relevant adminis-
trative costs are under different tax-subsidy schemes. 
One particular tax-subsidy scheme seems especially 
appealing for reasons of allocation, equity, and adminis·-
trative costs, that is, to raise interest rates on out-
standing loans. Such a policy would not only remove the 
source of the threat to financial institutions but would 
also immediately remove the subsidy still accruing to the 
recipients of loans with interest rates well below the 
competitive equilibrium. Against such a policy it might 
be argued that this would breach the sanctity of contracts, 
but loan contracts in some developing countries allow for 
the subsequent adjustment of interest rates, and in other 
developing countries there are precedents for the ex post 
adjustment of interest rates, contracts notwithstanding, 
especially in situations involving indexation for 
inflation)/ 
~/ The question of the burden placed on borrowers by the 
upward adjustment of interest rates on outstanding loans 
will be discussed below in the context of the third 
argument against successfully implementing a program 
of financial reform. 
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There is a final reason, and perhaps the most impor-
tant one, for not viewing the bankruptcy of financial insti-
tutions as a serious barrier to financial reform which 
required complex remedies. Most financial institutions 
in developing countries simply do not have a substantial 
proportion of their assets committed to long-term loans 
and investments on which the interest rates cannot be 
adjusted. In fact, one of the main complaints about 
finance in developing countries is that it is virtually 
all very short-term. In the case of agricultural credit, 
medium- and long-term loans to farmers are typically sup-
ported by (or more than supported by) long-term loans from 
international lending institutions and not by short-term 
deposits. Housing finance is the only sector in which 
long-term loans generally predominate, but even here the 
financial institutions in developing countries tend to 
rely heavily on long-term sources of funds and on deposits 
which may seem to be short-term but which are in fact com-
pulsory. 
Second Best 
The second argument against implementing a program of 
financial reform is based on the theory of the second best. 
Given the pervasive distortions which are often said to be 
the essence of a less developed economy, it is not at all 
certain that removing some distortions in financial markets 
by raising interest rates to their equilibrium levels, 
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while leaving undisturbed the distortions in other markets, 
will in fact make an economy better off. This argument 
has been made most forcefully for the maintenance of pref-
erential low interest rates for the agricultural sector 
in order to compensate for other distortions which place 
the agricultural sector at a disadvantage and which cannot 
easily be removed.~/ Such arguments appear to leave the 
proponents of financial reform in developing countries with 
two options, neither of which is very attractive: (1) to 
recommend a program of wholesale reform covering all aspects 
of the entire economy; or (2) to carry out a detailed 
general equilibrium analysis of the economy in order to 
demonstrate that the economy will indeed be better off 
with a reform that covers only financial markets. 
It is not the purpose of the present paper to argue 
that the theory of the second best is incorrect, but rather 
to argue that its warnings against partial reforms are not 
generally applicable for financial market reform in <level-
oping countries. The specific case to be examined here 
is thP. elimination of preferential low interest rates for 
the agricultural sector because, as indicated above, the 
strongest arguments have been made for the maintenance of 
this financial-market distortion in order to compensate 
the agricultural sector for other distortions which cannot 
3/ See, for example, Lizano. 
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readily be removed. The distortions most frequently men-
tioned which place the agricultural sector at a disadvan-
tage are government policies which turn the terms of trade 
against agriculture. Prices of food and other primary 
products are kept low in order to keep costs low in the 
industrial sector, while prices of manufactured inputs 
into agriculture are kept high in order· to encourage domes-
tic industrial production. Such distortions are especially 
evident in the international trade policies of developing 
countries, as tariffs on manufactured goods raise the costs 
of imported agricultural inputs or force the agricultural 
sector to purchase inferior domestically-produced inputs, 
while these same tariffs result in an overvalued exchange 
rate which implicitly taxes agricultural exports. In addi-
tion to these policy distortions, it is said that the lack 
of appropriate infrastructure and noncompetitive conditions 
in marketing further raise the prices of inputs for farmers 
and reduce the prices received at the farm for agricultural 
output. 
To these distortions which affect the prices of agri-
cultural inputs and outputs can be added a variety of other 
problems facing the agricultural sector which are thought 
by many to be distortions deserving compensation through 
preferential low interest rates. The development and dis-
semination of appropriate technology for the agricultural 
sector, and especially for small farmers, involves significant 
: 
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externalities and may also involve an inefficient govern-
ment bureaucracy in many developing countries. Rural 
inhabitants frequently face a disproportionate lack of 
infrastructure in such fields as education, health, and 
transportation, and this lack not only makes life in rural 
areas less agreeable but also raises the costs of produc-
tive activities in these areas. There is finally a distor-
tion which applies directly to financial markets in rural 
areas, and this is the high costs that lenders incur in 
attempting to obtain reliable information about the prob-
able repayment characteristics of potential borrowers, 
particularly when lender procedures are based on prior 
experience in urban situations and have not yet been adapted 
to rural circumstances. 
It would be nice to be able to think that these 
distortions could be overcome, or at least ameliorated, 
by the simple expedient of requiring that loans to the 
agricultural sector be made at low interest rates, and 
without the necessity of confronting each of these distor-
tions directly. The main problem with the view that 
preferential low interest rates can compensate the agri-
cultural sector for these distortions, and consequently 
that a program of financial reform would not make the 
agricultural sector and the economy in general better off, 
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is that it neglects the essential fact that credit is 
fungible.~/ 
To begin, it is necessary to note that there are two 
aspects to compensating the agricultural sector: income 
distribution and resource allocation. It can readily be 
shown that preferential low interest rates for the agri-
cultural sector do not improve the distribution of income 
according to most notions of equity. Although the distri-
bution of income is indeed biased away from the agricul-
tural sector by the distortions discussed above, it is 
the wealthy farmers who receive the lion's share of the 
benefits from preferential low interest rates. Most 
farmers and other rural inhabitants in developing coun-
tries receive no credit whatsoever at preferential low 
interest rates, and even in developing countries such as 
Costa Rica, which is often· cited for its wide distribution 
of agricultural credit, the distribution of credit is 
highly skewed toward large loans to large farmers.~/ 
Moreover, it is likely (although no definitive statistics 
are available) that the wealthy, including large farmers, 
hold a relatively small proportion of their wealth in the 
form of financial assets on which interest rates are cur-
rently controlled at low levels but would be raised to 
4/ See Von Pischke and Adams on fungibility. 
~/ See Vogel on credit distribution. 
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higher levels or freed entirely under a program of f inan-
cial reform. 
Because of the essential fungibility of credit, pref-
erential low interest rates for the agricultural sector 
also fail to redirect the allocation of resources in favor 
of the agricultural sector. Preferential low interest 
-
rates do not change the technologies available to farmers, 
nor the lack of infrastructure which raises costs, nor the 
prices paid by farmers for inputs and received for output. 
Hence, the relative profitability of agricultural and non-
agricultural undertakings is left unchanged, as is the rela-
tive attractiveness of different activities within the agri-
cultural sector. There is, however, one exception in that 
the price of capital is reduced for individuals with access 
to credit at preferential low interest rates, and these indi-
viduals are thereby encouraged to select more capital inten-
sive activities and to select more capital intensive technol-
ogies for those activities which would have been undertaken 
even without preferential low interest rates. Whether such 
a capital intensive bias helps to direct more resources 
to the agricultural sector is unclear, but such a bias 
certainly does not improve the demand for labor in develop-
ing countries, most of which are experiencing widespread 
unemployment. 
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Opponents of reform for rural financial markets may, 
however, object that their policies include not only pref-
erential low interest rates but also a larger volume of 
credit for the agricultural sector. This, they argue, 
will surely direct more resources to the agricultural sec-
tor, but here is precisely where the essential fungibility 
of credit cannot be overlooked, Credit provides a general 
connnand over resources and cannot be effectively tied to 
the production of particular goods, the purchase of parti-
cular inputs, or the use of particular technologies. As 
indicated above, credit at preferential low interest rates 
does not basically change the relative attractiveness of 
different activities, and to expect that farmers will sig-
nificantly redirect their activities when offered more 
credit at preferential low interest rates is to expect 
farmers to behave irrationally (in the face of mounting 
evidence that farmers, and even small traditional farmers, 
are quite rational). 
Concrete examples of fungibility can readily be found. 
Diversion of loans to other than prescribed uses by farmers 
in developing countries is widespread and has not been over-
come by even the most diligent (and costly) program of 
. . 6/ supervision.-
~/ See Lipton on the supervision of agricultural loans. 
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More subtle and more .pervasive is the case in which the 
farmer presents the lender with his most attractive under-
taking, one which would have been carried out ·even if a 
loan were not received, and then uses the additional 
resources obtained with the loan for some unspecified 
activity. Such behavior is likely to be especially prev-
alent for large farmers in developing countries who obtain 
the lion's share of agricultural credit and who most often 
have a variety of activities outside the agricultural sec-
tor. 
One distortion which places the agricultural sector 
at a disadvantage has not yet been discussed, and this is 
the distortion which applies directly to financial markets 
in rural areas: the high costs of obtaining information 
about potential borrowers until lenders adapt their proce-
dures to rural circumstances. An argument, not based on 
the theory of the second best, can be made that lenders 
should be subsidized to cover some of the cost of serving 
rural clients until the necessary expertise has been acquired 
through learning by doing. This, however, suggests pref-
erential low interest rates not for borrowers in the agri-
cultural sector but rather for lenders. It can also be 
argued that preferential low interest rates for agricul-
tural borrowers and increasing the volume of credit for the 
agricultural sector are contradictory policies in that pref-
erential low interest rates for agricultural borrowers, other 
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things being equal, encourage lenders to make less credit 
available for the agricultural sector and more for other 
activities. The theory of the second best, widespread 
distortions against agriculture in developing countries 
notwithstanding, does not provide a good reason for con-
tinuing policies of preferential low interest rates and 
failing to implement a program of rural financial market 
reform. 
Short-Run Losses 
The third argument against implementing a program of 
financial reform ironically grows out of some of the most 
forceful arguments in favor of reform. McKinnon (pp. 105-
111) argues convincingly in a section entitled "Financial 
Reform with Tears" that the costs of a traditional stabi-
lization program can be avoided when a program of finan-
cial reform is instead used to confront an inflationary 
situation. In a traditional stabilization program, mone-
tary expansion, and hence credit, is curtailed in order 
to combat inflation. This often not only has the intended 
impact of reducing aggregate demand, but also has the 
unintended result of reducing aggregate supply because the 
availability of credit for working capital and other pro-
ductive necessities is curtailed. Depending on the reduc-
tion in demand relative to the reduction in supply, little 
or no headway may be made against inflation, so that the 
major result of a traditional stabilization program is an 
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immediate and sharp reduction in output which cannot long 
be tolerated by elected (or even by unelected) officials. 
The alternative remedy for inflation proposed by 
McKinnon is a program of financial reform in which interest 
rates are raised substantially to make them at least posi-
tive in real terms if not at the levels that would prevail 
under competitive conditions. Higher interest rates on 
deposits would divert demand away from goods, especially 
inflation hedges, and thus help to alleviate inflationary 
pressures. The greater demand for financial assets would 
permit an expansion, rather than a contraction, of credit 
so that more working capital would be available. At the 
same time, higher interest rates on loans would improve 
the allocation of resources by diverting credit away from 
activities with low rates of return and toward those with 
high returns. Thus, inflation would be reduced and the 
economy would actually expand at a more rapid pace, there-
by avoiding the initial reduction in output which has under-
mined so many traditional stabilization programs. 
The ability of a program of financial reform to accel-
lerate economic growth depends on the extent to which saving 
can be increased and the allocation of resources can be 
improved. Unfortunately, there is little clear evidence 
that higher interest rates increase saving, although there 
is considerable evidence that higher interest rates on 
deposits do cause a greater proportion of savings to be 
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held as deposits with financial intermediaries. This 
represents an improvement in resource allocation to the 
extent that financial intermediaries can channel resources 
more efficiently from these savers to potential investors. 
However, the main source of the improvement in resource 
allocation is the higher interest rates on loans which 
direct scarce savings toward investment projects with higher 
yields, primarily by reducting the demand for credit by 
entrepreneurs with lower-yielding potential investments. 
Thus, anticipations of increased economic growth from a 
program of financial reform depend largely on the extent 
to which resources have been misallocated and, in partic-
ular, on the extent to which savings have been allocated 
to the wrong investment projects. 
Herein lies the paradox which may present a serious 
barrier to implementing a successful program of financial 
reform. Potential long-run benefits from reform will be 
great to the extent that savings are currently flowing in-
to investment projects with low yields, but this implies 
that there is a substantial stock of fixed capital which 
will be inappropriate for the economy after the reform has 
been carried out. This stock of inappropriate fixed capi-
tal is currently being made profitable by the subsidy implicit 
in the low interest rates on loans, but unlike the working 
capital in McKinnon's model of financial reform it cannot 
readily be reallocated to more profitable activities precisely 
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because it is fixed capital. This means that a signifi-
cant portion of the fixed capital in a pre-reform economy 
will suddenly, with the advent of a program of financial 
reform, be written down substantially in value, perhaps 
even to its salvage value if it ceases to have an economic 
use in the post-reform economy. If, as suggested under 
the first argument against financial reform, interest 
rates are raised on outstanding loans, then the burden on 
the inappropriate stock of fixed capital will be greater, 
and the ensuing disruptions and adjustments will take place 
more rapidly. 
The disruptions which McKinnon had hoped to avoid by 
his program of "financial reform without tears" will be 
of two sorts: economic and political. The economic dis-
ruptions will take the form of write downs in the value 
of fixed capital resulting in possible bankruptcies and 
in the realignment of numerous economic enterprises. It 
is difficult to see how a loss of output in the short run 
can be avoided during this period of adjustment, McKinnon 
notwithstanding, even though the benefits of improved 
resource allocation following from the financial reform 
will be vastly greater in the long run. The political dis-
ruptions will depend on the power of those who are losing 
their access to the credit subsidy stemming from the low 
interest rates on current loans and whose fixed capital 
is being written down substantially in value. It may be 
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that this group can be partially compensated (bought off) 
into acquiescence in a manner which is less harmful to 
resource allocation than the current credit subsidy. 
Such mechanisms have sometimes been proposed to compen-
sate those who lose the implicit subsidy from t~riffs in 
the process of international trade reform, and the discus-
sion of the last argument against financial reform will 
examine some of these parallels between international 
trade reform and financial reform. In any event, the 
greater the attractiveness of financial reform because 
of its potential long-run benefits in improved resource 
allocation, the more likely there are to be serious short-
run disruptions which will pose a barrier to implementing 
the reform. 
Reform of International Trade Policies 
The fourth argument against the possibility of putting 
a successful program of financial reform into practice is 
that it cannot be separated from other reforms, not in the 
sense of the theory of the second best discussed above, 
but rather in that there is a direct link between finan-
cial reforms and these other reforms. In particular, 
it has been argued that financial reform cannot be separated 
from a developing country's reform of its international 
economic policies, and in fact the books by both McKinnon 
• .
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and Shaw devote considerable attention to questions of 
international economic policy reforms. 
The necessary connection between financial reform 
and international economic policy reform can be seen 
most clearly by initially considering a situation in 
which a developing country has achieved, at least tem-
porarily, a stable exchange rate and a reasonable equi-
librium in its balance of payments. Into this situation 
a financial reform is introduced with its higher interest 
rates on loans and deposits. This will make the return 
on domestic financial assets higher relative to the return 
on foreign assets and will bring about an inflow of capi-
tal as both foreigners and the residents of the developing 
country shift out of foreign assets and into domestic 
financial assets. In addition, the higher interest rates 
on domestic loans will make it more attractive for both 
foreigners and the residents of the developing country 
who previously had access to low interest rate domestic 
loans to borrow in foreign financial markets, and this 
will further supplement the capital inflow. 
This inflow of capital into a developing country which 
previously had a stable exchange rate and equiiibrium in 
its balance of payments is usually viewed as a good thing, 
at least initially, because it represents a potential in-
crease in the country's foreign exchange reserves. Under 
a system of fixed exchange rates, which is typical for 
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most developing countries, this potential increase is 
translated into an actual increase in foreign exchange 
reserves, which in turn means an increase in the stock 
of high-powered money. The monetary authority in the 
developing.country which is undergoing financial reform 
under a system of fixed exchange rates is thus left with 
the unpleasant alternatives of either restricting domes-
tic credit to offset the increase in foreign exchange 
reserves or permitting a multiple increase in the money 
supply. Restricting domestic credit is likely to lead 
to the reduction in output that the financial reform was 
trying (a la McKinnon) to avoid, while permitting the in-
crease in the money supply will lead to more inflation 
and thereby undo the increase in real interest rates 
that the financial reform was trying to accomplish. 
Another alternative is to offset directly the poten-
tial increase in foreign exchange reserves by changing the 
exchange rate, that is, by increasing the value of the doces-
tic currency relative to foreign currencies. This, of course, 
happens automatically for those few developing countries 
which operate under systems of flexible, rather than fixed, 
exchange rates. The problem with this soulution is that i: 
curtails potential exports and encourages imports, both of 
which are likely to be at variance with the policy objec-
tives of the developing country and which will certainly 
• .
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be unpopular with producers for export and with domes-
tic producers of import substitutes .J_I 
The last alternative to be considered here is a liber-
alization of imports in order to offset the potential in-
crease in international reserves or appreciation of the 
exchange rate in a developing country undergoing a program 
of financial reform. Such a liberalization would involve 
the reduction of tariffs on goods which are thought to be 
overly protected and an elimination of quotas and other 
nontariff barriers against imports. However, these pol-
icies of import liberalization are likely to be strongly 
opposed by the domestic producers of import substitutes 
who are threatened with increased competition, and this 
is precisely the same group which was undoubtedly impor-
tant, if not instrumental, in initiating protection against 
imports. The politics of international trade policy has 
long been a popular subject, and in fact this literature 
is almost as abundant as the literature on the pros and 
cons of protection itself.~/ 
A second connection between financial reform and the 
reform 0£ international trade policies, and the final point 
II The problems which confronted Korea in attempting to 
coordinate a program of financial reform with the reform 
of its international economic policies are described in 
McKinnon, pp. 164 - 166, and in Shaw, pp. 210 - 212. 
~/ See Ray for a recent example of work integrating the 
politics and economics of protection. 
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to be considered in the present paper, is the relevance 
of this literature on international reform for under-
standing the politics of financial reform. There is a 
very close parallel between the gainers and losers from 
a program of financial reform and the gainers and losers 
from changes in tariffs and other forms of protection. 
A point frequently made about the politics of interna-
tional trade reform is that the gainers from reduced pro-
tection are a widely dispersed group, consumers, each of 
whom benefits relatively little from reform, whereas the 
losers are a relatively small and cohesive group, pro-
ducers of import substitues, each of whom may lose a 
great deal from reduced protection. In the case of finan-
cial reform, the gainers are likewise a widely dispersed 
group, the holders of deposits on which interest rates 
have been kept at low levels, each of whom is likely to 
gain relatively little through higher interest rates, 
whereas the losers who have to this point been benefiting 
from subsidized low interest rates on their loans are 
likely to be a relatively small group of economically 
important individuals, if the agricultural credit situa-
tion in developing countries is at all indicative. Thus, 
in both financial and international trade reform, although 
the gains outweigh the losses in the aggregate, the losers 
are likely to have the incentive and the position to oppose 
reform strongly and effectively. 
I . 
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The parallel between financial reform and interna-
tional trade reform can easily be extended further. For 
example, the villains who are supposed to be overcome by 
tariff protection and by subsidized low interest rates 
can readily be identified in both cases. In international 
trade it is the foreign producers who depend for their 
advantage either on advanced technology or on cheap labor 
according to the perspective of those desiring protection, 
while in financial markets it is the banks, and especially 
the private moneylenders. Why do these villains fail to 
support reform? The foreign producers are busy buying 
out domestic producers or setting up their own facilities 
behind the tariff and nontariff barriers, while the banks 
are content to earn profits in a regulated rather than a 
competitive environment, and the private moneylenders are 
also not eager to encourage competition and prefer to 
talk only about their nonmoneylending business activities. 
Other likely sources of opposition to financial reform are 
the government officials and loan officers who see the 
distribution of credit at subsidized low interest rates 
as a possible source of patronage. Similar behavior in 
the international trade context may explain why quotas 
are so often favored over tariffs in situations in which 
tariffs are clearly superior on economic grounds: quotas 
provide more direct control over patronage.~/ 
~/ See Lipton for a more radical view of the creation and 
distribution of credit subsidies. 
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Conclusions 
Among the main conclusions to emerge from an examina-
tion of these f~ur arguments against the possibility of 
implementing a successful program of financial reform are 
that the first two arguments should not represent serious 
barriers to reform. Widespread bankruptcy of financial 
institutions is not likely to occur in a developing coun-
try undergoing a program of financial reform because most 
financial institutions in developing countries do simply 
not have the structure of assets and liabilities which 
would expose them to the threat of bankruptcy in the event 
that interest rates were raised substantially. For those 
financial institutions which are in fact threatened with 
bankruptcy, there are a number of alternative remedies 
that could be considered, with perhaps the most attrac-
tive option being to raise interest rates on outstanding 
loans. The theory of the second best also fails to pro-
duce a convincing argument against implementing a program 
of financial reform. Even granting the existence of serious 
distortions in most developing countries, and in partic-
ular distortions which place the agricultural sector at 
a disadvantage, does not mean that a program of prefer-
ential low interest rates can compensate for these distor-
tions. In fact, because of the fungibility of credit and 
the concentration of agricultural credit in large loans 
to large farmers, preferential low interest rates nee uniquely 
ill-suited to compensate for distortions in other markets. 
... 
' 
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The last two arguments against financial reform pro-
vide both political and economic reasons to be concerned 
about the possibility of implementing a successful pro-
gram of financial reform. To the extent that a program 
of financial reform promises a significant long-run in-
crease in economic growth because of a substantial cur-
rent misallocation of resources, it also promises a sig-
nificant disruption of output in the short-run. In addi-
tion, those who see their fixed capital being written 
down substantially in value because of a program of f inan-
c ial reform can be expected to provide a strong political 
opposition to reform. The connection in developing coun-
tries between financial reform and the reform of inter-
national trade policies is especially important for at 
least two reasons. First, because of capital flows, it 
is difficult to conceive of a successful program of finan-
cial reform without some measure of international trade 
reform. Second, because of the close political parallels 
between financial reform and international trade reform, 
the abundant literature on the politics of trade reform 
may provide some insights into the possibility of imple-
menting financial reforms and, in particular, what forms 
of compensation and other devices might minimize the opposi-
tion to financial reform. More detailed study of countries, 
such as Taiwan and Chile, which have carried out programs 
of financial reform may also indicate how the opposition to 
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reform can be overcome. In Chile, for example, the eco-
nomic chaos toward the end of the Allende regime may iron-
ically have removed effective opposition to the military 
government's financial reforms. 
• 
. 
• 
... 
' 
' 
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